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Questions have been raised about the transparency and scientific
quality of regulatory processes applied in the first open field releases
of genetically modified (GM) insects, and there is concern that
inappropriate precedents have been set [1], particularly through
generic risk assessments covering multiple species and technologies
[2]. The GM insects tested in the field so far are intended for sterile
insect release programs against a major pest of cotton (pink
bollworm, Pectinophora gossypiella) in the United States [3] and against
Aedes aegypti, the mosquito vector of dengue fever, in the Cayman
Islands [4], Malaysia [5], and Brazil [6]. In the pink bollworm
release, the GM insects were sterilised by radiation and the GM trait
was a heritable red marker colour that allowed discrimination from
wild types. In the Aedes aegypti releases, the mosquitoes carried an
inserted inherited dominant lethality trait that causes late larval
stage mortality in offspring of homozygous and heterozygous
individuals, as well as the colour marker trait to provide an essential
discrimination from wild types. For control programs, insects with
new genetic properties could be introduced either in large numbers
in self-limiting populations or in smaller numbers in self-replicating
populations for a specific beneficial purpose [7,8], but releases have
so far only involved the self-limiting category.
The release of GM insects into the environment poses two
broad risk issues. There are potential environmental risks
associated with the introduction of large numbers of any selected
mass-reared population, in many cases of an alien species, that can
interact with both the wild population of that species and other,
non-target organisms, including humans. There are also specific
risks related to the GM technologies introduced into the process,
which may also interact with the broader environment through
particular expressed traits, such as metabolic products, or through
fitness differences compared to untransformed insects. In terms of
mass release risks, we should expect GM insects to be regulated in
a way that is similar to that applied to the widespread release of
conventional beneficial insects, for which there are already
international guidelines [9]. Given the potential for natural or
assisted spread from insect releases, for both the intended
organisms and any secondary pathogens, parasites, etc., this may
need regional or international decisions (an example was the
beneficial parasite of the cassava mealybug in Africa [10]). While
such assessments should be carried out on a case-by-case basis, this
process can build on the vast experience of new organism
introductions that have already been made.
National regulations, while not consistent in operation across all
countries, determine the conditions under which non-GM insects
can be released, and examples of such releases are common from
all continents. The release of GM insects is, in principle, a similar
activity. There is not yet any widely accepted specific guidance for
GM insect releases. There is a regional standard in North America
for the movement and confined field release of transgenic insects
[11], while international guidance is still in preparation on open
field release of GM mosquitoes [12]. The Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety offers broad principles on risk assessment for GM
organisms [13], but no specific guidance for GM insects.
Billions of mass-reared insects, which are not GM, are released
into the wild each week around the world. Many are non-native
pest species reared, irradiated, and distributed in sterile insect
release programs [14]. In addition to sterile releases, fertile
biological control agents, including insects, have also been
released, so far in over 7,000 cases [15]. They are released in
large numbers in continuous augmentative control programs and
in smaller numbers for long-term self-replication to suppress pest
species. Using a similar approach, mosquitoes infected with strains
of Wolbachia bacteria intended to reduce their ability to transmit
dengue have been released in the wild to establish self-replicating
populations of infected mosquitoes [16]. Millions of pollinators are
released on a regular basis in both protected and field crops, often
imported from abroad [17].
The majority of these releases have been widely accepted as
beneficial, although some have failed and some risks are
recognised as constraints for these uses [14,15,17,18]. As in the
case of GM insect technologies, biological control scientists are
calling for proper adherence to national regulations and
international standards as they continue to search for and release
new agents [15]. Pollination with imported pollinators is under
review [17] due to declines in native pollinators in many countries.
Some sterile insect procedures have begun to be standardised to
assure quality and reduce risks [19]. A common standard for risk
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assessment procedures for mass-released insects may be helpful,
given the scale of worldwide releases.
The appropriateness of generic environmental risk assessment
has been questioned [1]. It may be more appropriate to consider
generic risk factors, rather than to assess the risk of technically
unrelated GM applications in a range of unrelated species. For
example, there may be some aspects of risk that are genuinely
generic, and where examples from other species and relevant
applications can be useful. A generic risk in releasing GM insects
with inherited lethality traits is whether sterile insect technique
(SIT) will be successful with some proportion of females and ‘‘non-
sterile’’ individuals present in the releases. The long history of
radiation-induced sterile insect release in fruit flies, with
conventional breeding of strains to develop genetic sexing so that
‘‘male only’’ releases can be made, gives some demonstration of
the robustness of such programs [14]. Excessive radiation reduces
fitness, so a compromise is made between fitness and sterility. As a
result, typical sterility levels are around 95%–99% sterile [20] (the
Cayman GM mosquitoes produced 96.5% lethality [4]). The
sexing process is also not complete, yielding around 99% males at
release for sterile Mediterranean fruit fly programmes [21] (the
Cayman GM mosquitoes were 99.55% male [4]). Release
programs work effectively and efficiently with these levels,
although employing GM to achieve the same objectives could
prove more efficient in many cases. The high level of sterility,
albeit not perfect, and the predominance of released males over
successive releases ensures that any small proportion of non-sterile
insects or females do not have a significant impact on the overall
control performance, particularly as wild populations diminish
rapidly after releases start. Establishment of viable populations
from SIT releases with small proportions of males and non-sterile
individuals would be most likely to show up in preventative release
programmes, where released insects have no direct intraspecific
competition. With extensive surveillance, no populations of
Medflies have established from released ‘‘male-only’’, ‘‘sterile’’
Medflies in Florida or California, where preventative sterile insect
release programs are underway [14]. In GM insect control under
the SIT, even with some residual low levels of fertility and some
females in the releases, similar results could be anticipated.
Fitness may also be a generic risk issue. GM pink bollworms
were shown to be more fit, as measured by relative recapture in
pheromone traps, than a conventional mass-reared strain, but this
was attributed to the GM strain being more recently developed
and reared under more relaxed conditions [3], and neither may be
optimal. This emphasises the need to consider the whole rearing
system, and not just the GM trait alone in risk assessments. GM
mosquitoes released in the Caymans were less fit than wild types
[4]. While relatively low fitness of mass-released insects is
detrimental to performance, it is recognised as reducing the risk
of unwanted persistence [8].
Have the regulatory processes in the United States, Cayman
Islands, and Malaysia been an undue precedent for the decisions
on GM insects elsewhere? In Brazil, the next release location,
sterile male A. aegypti have been released in the field in the state of
Bahia, starting in early 2011 [6,22]. The release was approved by
Comissa˜o Te´cnica Nacional de Biosseguranc¸a (CTNBio) [23], the
national regulator, after local review of the regulatory process,
which had not previously addressed GM insects specifically. In
Brazil, CTNBio was established to approve GM organism releases
on the basis of an evaluation of plant, animal, and human health
and environmental protection [24]. To achieve competence in
assessing technical evidence, administrative processes, and public
perceptions, the commission is composed of 27 members,
including technical specialists and representatives of various
responsible ministries. In the case of commercial release, a public
hearing can be requested by interested parties, but CTNBio may
agree to commercial confidentiality in relation to parts of some
applications. While the process is not transparent, it should be
publicly accountable. In terms of informed public consent, it was
argued that there is a history of sterile fruit fly release in the area,
from the local MoscaMed facility, where the GM mosquitoes are
produced, and that people in the area may be more familiar with
the concept of sterile insect release than in many places. Many
examples of Brazilian television coverage can be seen on the
Internet, where the releases have been set in the context of dengue
control and have been indicated as transgenic. Many aspects of the
process have been critically reviewed [22], though it is not clear
that shortcomings are due to precedents from earlier cases.
The Malaysian decision to allow limited trial release of
manually sexed male mosquitoes referred to the outcome of the
Cayman Island trial, not the risk assessment for it [25]. It also
allowed a step-wise release program in which each step of
increasing assessed level of risk is dependent on assessment of
earlier outcomes, so the decision is not based on broad acceptance
of a generic approach. The decision was principally based on a risk
assessment determining ‘‘quite low’’ risk, particularly taking into
account risk mitigation, such as manual sexing. Risk assessment
outcomes can be more formally described, for example, much
effort has been made in this regard in the field of climate change
[26], and acceptability can be pre-defined, as in the Australian
gene technology risk analysis framework [27]. In the Australian
definitions of risk acceptability, risk mitigation is taken into
account, so even high intrinsic risks may be acceptable with
feasible and effective mitigation.
In Europe, the European Food Safety Authority commissioned
an extensive report on GM insect issues in 2010 [7] and is
currently preparing guidance for GM insects within a broader
context of GM animals [28], quite independent of any precedents
elsewhere. The Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environ-
ment (ACRE) in the United Kingdom [29] recently considered the
limitations of the current UK and European Union (EU)
regulatory frameworks for GM insects and observed that,
particularly in the case of GM vector control, there was a need
for a more holistic approach than is currently provided by
Directive 2001/18/EC, which focusses on environmental risks
from new GM technology. ACRE considered there was a need for
risks from a GM approach to be compared against the full range of
risks associated with existing alternative approaches (such as
insecticides) and the risks of inaction (inadequately controlled
disease). It would be a significant shift to move from a forward-
driven risk assessment process, in which ever diminishing marginal
hazards are identified, to one addressing the probability that
benefits will not exceed the combined sum of environmental,
social, and other costs There are currently no international
standards for assessing benefits from new organism releases [30].
An environmental risk assessment (ERA) for GM organisms in
the EU should be done individually for each case [30]. The United
States Department of Agriculture Environmental Impact State-
ment (USDA EIS) combining several species and technologies [2]
states that it is aimed at providing a broad overview of impacts,
and indicates procedures that the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) would follow prior to the release of
GM insects in which site- and application-specific risk character-
istics would be considered. The USDA EIS envisages revisions of
the broad overview of risks as new technologies are developed and
new risks are identified. An EU GM organism ERA requires 1)
data on the genetic modification and its mechanism in the species;
2) data on rearing, release, and the receiving environment; 3) data
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on the dynamic interactions of the GM insect and the
environment; and 4) validated and detailed protocols for
monitoring and control of the GM insect after release [30,31]. A
monitoring plan is needed to ensure that hazards not identified in
the ERA can be detected as early as possible and remedial action
taken. An emergency response plan that can prevent spread and
further negative impacts if they occur is considered essential for
risk communication to the public [30]. Responsibility is shared in
the approval process, the regulator sets out the data required, the
applicant provides the ERA to meet those requirements, and the
regulator then assesses the validity and relevance of the use,
methods, data, and release plans described.
Formally assessing the scientific quality of information for
approvals for uncaged GM insect field trials [1] has merit. The
Australian GM risk analysis framework [27] also includes a list of
quality criteria for evidence, which includes reliability, transpar-
ency, robustness, etc., with examples of increasing levels of utility.
This approach could be adapted further to assign semi-
quantitative levels of confidence to the specific components of a
risk assessment, as is done in some risk analyses for agricultural
pests and non-native species [32]. This would allow the inevitable
uncertainty to be explicitly addressed, where necessary. Explicit
characterisation of uncertainty in specific risk components allows
research priorities to be determined by developers and regulators.
How should potential benefits be considered? Risk assessment
focusses on likelihoods and consequences of identified hazards,
without direct consideration of benefits. However, the benefits of
actions are often offset against the risks in determining how
acceptable risks are in practical management decisions at a social
or political level, where risk assessment and management can
merge into benefit cost analysis [33]. If and when full-scale
implementation of GM insects becomes a reality, risk assessment
will be superseded by benefit-cost studies [34], where further issues
related to appropriate measures of efficacy and the value of the
threat that is controlled will arise and be debated, as the current
risk assessments are. The Malaysian limited release decision takes
note of socioeconomic drivers such as dengue deaths and medical
costs, in addition to the risk assessment, which is already a step
towards a benefit-cost approach to adoption. The Australian risk
analysis framework notes that while benefits are not directly
considered, they do affect perceptions of risk tolerance [27].
In the case of Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes in Australia, the
regulatory problem formulation was defined through the endpoint
hazard: will release of the infected mosquitoes ‘‘cause more harm’’,
considering adverse hazards and their likelihood over a 30-year
horizon, than continuing to manage mosquitoes and dengue in a
conventional way [35]? It was determined, through a combination
of expert evidence and representative community participation,
that the releases, which do not involve genetic modifications, had a
negligible risk (the product of likelihoods and consequences) of
causing more harm. One of the most significant components of
this very small risk was that public perception would consider that
the dengue problem was solved by the releases, and other
complementary control actions may be abandoned or lessened
as a result. While Wolbachia was assessed as a veterinary chemical
product [36], the ‘‘causes more harm’’ formulation of risk is in line
with the approach to potential risks from beneficial organisms
presented in the Australian Biological Control Act 1984 [37]. This
legislation is particularly intended for cases where there are
conflicting interests concerned with releases that may be perceived
as beneficial by some and not others [36], which is a situation that
may often apply with GM insect applications. The scientists
releasing Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes in Australia struggled to
find national regulatory procedures that could be applied to their
novel technology to ensure responsible oversight and approval.
The risk assessors in that case have called for the regulatory
process to be reviewed to ensure that it is appropriate for both
proponents and regulators [36].
An overarching set of principles and standards for the safe
rearing and intentional release of any insects, including GM
insects, would ensure that the appropriate science is applied in all
cases, a common level of risk assessment is conducted, and
proportionate risk management is undertaken where risks are
accepted. The ‘‘causes more harm’’ test may be a useful common
denominator in achieving this, and the broad experience of mass
releases of other species and technologies should inform the
process.
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